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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
         David Friedland appeals from orders entered on March 2, 
1995, and August 3, 1995, in these post-conviction proceedings in 
which he seeks release from incarceration.  The district court 
denied his applications by the order of March 2, 1995, 
implementing the conclusions it reached in United States v. 
Friedland, 879 F. Supp. 420 (D.N.J. 1995), and denied his motion 
for reconsideration by the order of August 3, 1995.  Essentially, 
Friedland claims that his continued incarceration through denial 
of parole contravenes the intentions of the district court when 
it sentenced him and is not justifiable under the parole 
guidelines and that his cooperation with agents of the United 
States Government in furthering criminal prosecutions and the 
interdiction of narcotics entitles him to have his sentence 
shortened by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 
35(b). 
 
              I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
         The case has an extraordinary background.  Friedland, 
who has been a New Jersey state senator, was general counsel to 
the Teamsters Local 701 Pension Fund in North Brunswick, New 
Jersey in the 1970s.  He used this position to obtain kickbacks 
for arranging loans from the pension fund.  This conduct and his 
efforts to cover it up led to his indictment and conviction for 
conspiracy, soliciting and receiving kickbacks, interstate and 
foreign travel to facilitate bribery, obstruction of justice, and 
income tax evasion.  The district court sentenced Friedland to 
seven years in prison and we affirmed.  United States v. 
Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 922-25 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2268 (1982).   
         Following his conviction, Friedland avoided serving his 
sentence by agreeing to cooperate with the government in the 
investigation of other crimes.  However, he took this opportunity 
to engage in additional criminal activity involving the Local 701 
pension fund.  See United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 140-42 
& n.1, 153 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066, 109 S.Ct. 
1349 (1989).  At that time, instead of receiving kickbacks, 
Friedland began paying them to obtain money from the Pension Fund 
for high risk investments. 
         When his second and independent criminal episode began 
to unravel, Friedland took a unique step to avoid apprehension.  
In 1985, he staged his drowning in a scuba-diving accident in the 
Bahamas.  We presume that Friedland hoped that the government 
simply would write him off so that he could avoid apprehension.  
While we do not know whether the government agents ever thought 
Friedland was dead, for more than two years he did remain at 
large.  However, in December 1987 he was found and arrested on 
the Maldive Islands in the Indian Ocean.  He then was returned to 
New Jersey for trial on an indictment for the second group of 
offenses.  This trial ended when, pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Friedland pleaded guilty to a count charging RICO conspiracy.  On 
December 2, 1988, the court sentenced Friedland on this count to 
a 15-year custodial term to be served concurrently to the seven- 
year term imposed on his original convictions.  App. 81.  At 
that time, the court had a report from a probation officer 
calculating Friedland's parole guideline range as between 40 and 
52 months, and the court indicated that it believed that 
Friedland should serve a term within that range.  App. 70-71.  On 
March 30, 1989, Friedland filed a timely motion for reduction of 
sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), but following a hearing on 
May 12, 1989, the district court entered an order denying the 
motion.  Supp. app. 7, 8.   
         While one might have thought that Friedland's ability 
to scheme now had been exhausted, events prove that this was not 
so.  In early 1989, his attorney approached the United States 
Attorney in New Jersey and offered Friedland's services in 
supplying information regarding certain crimes.  On April 3, 
1989, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., then the United States Attorney for 
the District of New Jersey, wrote the attorney and said that, 
while his office would accept any information, he was making it 
"absolutely clear . . . [his office] will not make any promises, 
express or implied, to do anything whatsoever on behalf of your 
client."  App. 78.   
         This rebuff did not deter Friedland.  Rather, he 
devised what he characterized as a "program" to obtain 
information regarding illegal drug activity from other inmates 
that he intended to barter to the government in return for having 
his own sentence shortened.  App. 119.  Unfortunately for 
Friedland, however, Michael Chertoff, who since had replaced 
Alito as United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, 
did not regard the supplying of brokered information as a basis 
for a reduction of Friedland's sentence.  Chertoff thus continued 
Alito's attitude toward Friedland.    
         Undaunted, Friedland sought to circumvent Chertoff by 
finding other agents of the government who might help him.  This 
search led him to Anthony Longarzo, a special agent of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.  Friedland dealt with Longarzo for 
about three months in the summer of 1990.  Gov. app. 53-54.  
Friedland offered to give information to Longarzo who, according 
to Friedland, agreed to recommend to the sentencing court and the 
United State Parole Commission that his sentence be reduced.  
Gov. app. at 4-5.  Friedland did deliver information leading to 
the seizure of narcotics and several arrests.  Id.  Friedland 
also contacted assistant United States attorneys in districts 
other than New Jersey seeking to obtain their aid in having his 
period of incarceration shortened. 
         Friedland's initial parole hearing was scheduled for 
early in 1993.  Chertoff opposed his parole and wrote a letter on 
January 7, 1993, to John R. Simpson, regional commissioner of the 
United States Parole Commission, expressing his views.  Gov. app. 
56.  Chertoff knew that Friedland had been in touch with the 
United States Attorney's office in the Eastern District of New 
York, and thus Chertoff sought information from that office 
regarding Friedland's activities.  In response to Chertoff's 
request, on March 7, 1993, Patricia E. Notopoulos, an assistant 
United States attorney for the Eastern District of New York, 
wrote to Chertoff regarding Friedland.  She indicated that 
Friedland did not have a written agreement with her office and 
that her office had made no promises to him.  She stated that, 
although she told Friedland that she would relay the information 
he provided to the District of New Jersey, that district "was the 
sole authority that would decide what benefit, if any, he would 
receive for the information he provided."  App. 86.  She also 
related that Friedland had given reliable information to Longarzo 
that he obtained from another inmate and that, as a result, a 
"mule" carrying approximately five kilograms of heroin had been 
arrested at Kennedy Airport.  Id.  She explained that Friedland 
revealed the name of the informant who had given him the 
information, and that the informant agreed that Friedland could 
take the credit for the information.  She further indicated that 
the informant gave additional information to her office, which 
led to additional arrests.  App. 87. 
         On March 9, 1993, Chertoff wrote to Friedland's 
attorney and enclosed a copy of Notopoulos's letter.  Chertoff 
indicated that his office generally considered it bad policy to 
give credit to an individual who was merely brokering someone 
else's information, and that it did not want to create a 
"secondary market" in benefits awarded for cooperation.  Chertoff 
said that his office therefore would continue strongly to oppose 
Friedland's application for parole.  Gov. app. 59. 
         On March 10, 1993, a two-person panel of the Parole 
Commission held a hearing on Friedland's case and then referred 
the case to the regional commissioner for an original 
jurisdiction determination.  28 C.F.R.  2.17(b)(2)(ii).  The 
panel also recommended to the regional commissioner that he set a 
presumptive parole date of December 24, 1994, which would 
represent 84 months of incarceration, and that the commissioner 
require financial disclosure as a special condition of parole.  
Gov. app. 64. 
         On March 18, 1993, Chertoff wrote to the regional 
commissioner arguing against the panel's recommendation for 
parole.  In support of his position, Chertoff enclosed a cover- 
story from the New York Daily News in which Friedland described 
his life as a fugitive to a reporter using the French Alps as a 
backdrop.  He also enclosed other newspaper and magazine 
articles, as well as a transcript of a television interview that 
Chertoff characterized as glamorizing Friedland and his criminal 
escapades, particularly his flight as a fugitive.  Chertoff 
pointed out that Friedland had made himself into a high profile 
celebrity figure.  Thus, his parole would be "highly publicized" 
and would "appropriately be viewed by the public as outrageous 
given Friedland's crimes and his disdain for the criminal justice 
system."  Gov. app. 66.   
         On March 25, 1993, the regional commissioner rendered a 
report referring Friedland's case to the national commissioners 
and recommending that parole be denied.  The regional 
commissioner decided that the aggravating factors in Friedland's 
case outweighed his cooperation and favorable institutional 
adjustment.  He reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact 
that under the parole guidelines Friedland's offense severity and 
salient factor score indicated that parole ordinarily would be 
appropriate.  The commissioner alluded to Friedland's fraudulent 
behavior, and concluded that Friedland was "a more serious risk 
to the community than a person normally placed in the 'very good' 
parole risk group."  Gov. app. 70. 
         On April 19, 1993, the national commissioners issued an 
original jurisdiction decision in Friedland's case.  They ruled 
that Friedland should serve his entire sentence and also should 
be subject to a special financial disclosure condition.  While 
they recognized that a mechanical application of the parole 
guidelines provided for a range of 40 to 52 months before parole, 
they concluded that the aggravating factors in his case warranted 
a longer sentence.  These factors included the diversion of 
$20,000,000 from the Local 701 Pension Fund for placement in high 
risk investments which caused the fund a $4,500,000 loss, the 
fact that Friedland had committed this offense while supposedly 
cooperating with the government while released on bond, his tax 
evasion not related to the crime, his attempt at escape by faking 
his drowning, and an attempt to influence grand jury testimony.  
The national commissioners, agreeing with the regional 
commissioner, concluded that Friedland was "a poorer risk than 
indicated by [his] salient factor score."  App. 66.  Friedland 
appealed but the full national Commission affirmed the decision 
in an opinion dated July 27, 1993, concluding that the original 
decision complied with applicable regulations.  App. 65. 
         After the denial of parole, Friedland persisted in his 
efforts to have his sentence reduced by continuing to seek help 
from assistant United States attorneys from the Eastern District 
of New York.  The Eastern District prosecutors, however, told him 
that he should discuss his case with the United States Attorney 
for the District of New Jersey and that they could not file a 
motion for reduction of his sentence.  Gov. app. 9-10. 
         Subsequently, Friedland instituted the three 
proceedings leading directly to these appeals.  He moved in the 
district court for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) and brought two petitions for habeas 
corpus.  He filed one petition under 28 U.S.C.  2241, naming as 
respondents the warden of the Federal Correctional Facility at 
Fort Dix, New Jersey, where he was then confined, and the United 
States Parole Commission, and one petition under 28 U.S.C.  2255 
in which he sought a reduction of sentence.  The district court 
denied Friedland relief without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing.  United States v. Friedland, 879 F. Supp. 420. 
         In its opinion, the district court set forth the 
background described above.  It explained that Fed. R. Crim. P. 
35(b), which was amended significantly effective November 1, 
1987, was applicable in its current form in this case, but that 
the old form of Rule 35(b) also was applicable, as this case 
arose before November 1, 1987, when the sentencing guidelines 
became effective.  Friedland, 879 F. Supp. at 426.  See United 
States v. Hernandez, 34 F.3d 998, 999 n.1 (11th Cir 1994); United 
States v. Weaver, 884 F.2d 549, 850 (11th Cir. 1989).  It further 
pointed out that Rule 35(b) now reads as follows: 
         Reduction of Sentence for Changed 
         Circumstances.  The court, on motion of the 
         Government made within one year after the 
         imposition of the sentence, may reduce a 
         sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent, 
         substantial assistance in the investigation 
         or prosecution of another person who has 
         committed an offense, in accordance with the 
         guidelines and policy statements issued by 
         the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
         994 of title 28, United States Code.  The 
         court may consider a government motion to 
         reduce a sentence made one year or more after 
         imposition of the sentence where the 
         defendant's substantial assistance involves 
         information or evidence not known by the 
         defendant until one year or more after 
         imposition of sentence.  The court's 
         authority to reduce a sentence under this 
         subsection includes the authority to reduce 
         such sentence to a level below that 
         established by statute as a minimum sentence. 
Consequently, the court could not reduce a defendant's sentence 
under the new rule absent a motion by the government.   
Friedland, 879 F. Supp. at 426.  See United States v. Francois, 
889 F.2d 1341, 1345 (4th Cir. 1989). 
         The court noted that, in Wade v. United States, 112 
S.Ct. 1840 (1992), the Supreme Court held that, even when a 
defendant has provided assistance to prosecutors, the government 
can refuse to move for a downwards departure under 18 U.S.C.  
3553(e) unless the prosecutor bases the refusal on a 
constitutionally suspect ground such as race or religion.  The 
district court then indicated that the court might consider such 
a motion, even if not made by the government, if the government 
previously had entered into an agreement requiring it.  
Friedland, 879 F. Supp. at 426-27.  The court held that, even if 
Longarzo's statements were considered promises to Friedland, 
there was no evidence that Longarzo had the authority to make the 
promises.  Id. at 427.  See LaPorta v. United States, 651 F. 
Supp. 884, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1986).  Furthermore, Friedland could not 
show either that the government had an unconstitutional motive in 
refusing to file the motion or that its refusal to file the 
motion was not related to a legitimate government objective.  SeeWade, 112 
S.Ct. at 1844. 
         The district court also held that Friedland was not 
entitled to relief under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) as it existed 
before November 1, 1987.  Friedland, 879 F. Supp. at 428.  The 
rule at that time read as follows: 
              Reduction of Sentence.  A motion to 
         reduce a sentence may be made, or the court 
         may reduce a sentence without motion, within 
         120 days after the sentence is imposed or 
         probation is revoked, or within 120 days 
         after receipt by the court of a mandate 
         issued upon affirmance of the judgment or 
         dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days 
         after entry of any order or judgment of the 
         Supreme Court denying review of, or having 
         the effect of upholding, a judgment of 
         conviction or probation revocation.  The 
         court shall determine the motion within a 
         reasonable time.  Changing a sentence from a 
         sentence of incarceration to a grant of 
         probation shall constitute a permissible 
         reduction of sentence under this subdivision. 
The court first indicated that the 120-day limit in the rule was 
jurisdictional.  United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189, 
99 S.Ct. 2235, 2242-43 (1979).  While Friedland sought to 
circumvent the time limit by characterizing his motion as one for 
reconsideration of his March 30, 1989 motion to reduce his 
sentence, he could not avoid the rule on this basis because he 
had developed his "program" to obtain a reduction of his sentence 
after he had served his original motion.  Friedland, 879 F. Supp. 
at 429.  See United States v. Irendino, 655 F.2d 108, 109-10 (7th 
Cir. 1981). 
         The court next considered Friedland's petition under 28 
U.S.C.  2255.  Friedland there argued that the government had 
been "selectively invidious" in failing to file a Rule 35(b) 
motion on his behalf.  He also contended that its failure to file 
the motion constituted a breach of its contract with Friedland.  
The court dismissed these claims for the same reasons that it 
dismissed the motion filed directly under Rule 35(b).  Friedland, 
879 F. Supp. at 429. 
         The court then addressed Friedland's application under 
28 U.S.C.  2241.  It rejected his claim that the severity level 
for his offense recognized by the Parole Commission was 
unjustified, as it was clear that the Pension Fund suffered a 
loss in excess of the threshold amount for that level.  The court 
also rejected Friedland's contention that the Parole Commission 
did not have good cause for exceeding its guidelines as required 
by 18 U.S.C.  4206(c) and set forth at length its reasons for 
this conclusion.  Furthermore, the court rejected Friedland's 
contention that United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 99 
S.Ct. 2235, which held that the Parole Commission's determination 
did not have to be controlled by the district court's intentions 
regarding parole, was inapplicable in view of the abolition of 
the Parole Commission, which the Crime Control Act of 1984 had 
provided would be effective in 1992. 
         Finally, the court rejected Friedland's contention that 
he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C.  2255.  
The court reasoned that, while an evidentiary hearing is required 
to resolve disputed facts, a hearing was not required in this 
case because, even under Friedland's view of the facts, he was 
not entitled to relief.  United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41-42 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 
1989).  After the district court denied Friedland's motion for 
reconsideration, he filed this appeal. 
 
                          II. DISCUSSION 
 
 
1. Old Rule 35(b) 
 
         It is clear that Friedland's motion under old Rule 
35(b), applicable because Friedland committed the offense before 
the sentencing guidelines became effective, was untimely.  That 
rule required Friedland to make his motion within 120 days of 
sentencing.  Friedland did move for reduction of sentence within 
that period but the district court denied the motion and 
Friedland did not appeal from that denial.  Friedland's motion 
under old Rule 35(b), now before us, is literally years late, 
because he filed it after the Parole Commission rejected his 
application for parole. 
         We recognize that Friedland has characterized his new 
motion under Rule 35(b) as a "motion for reconsideration of 
reduction of sentence."  Gov. app. 1.  But this ploy does not 
change the fact that the motion was untimely under old Rule 
35(b).  As the district court noted, citing United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 189, 99 S.Ct. at 2242-43, the 120-day 
limit is jurisdictional, and cannot be extended.  Consequently, a 
defendant may not file an untimely motion for reduction of 
sentence and relate it back to a timely motion because treating 
the second motion as timely would frustrate the purpose of the 
time limitation in old Rule 35(b).  See United States v. Ferri, 
686 F.2d 147, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 
103 S.Ct. 1205 (1983); United States v. Dansker, 581 F.2d 69, 72 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
         Friedland's use of old Rule 35(b) was a particularly 
blatant violation of the time constraint policy of the rule 
because in the motion he relied on his efforts to implement his 
"program" as a basis for a reduction of sentence.  Of course, he 
did not even devise this "program" until after the expiration of 
the 120-day period for serving a motion to reduce sentence under 
old Rule 35(b).  Furthermore, inasmuch as Friedland made his 
motion after the Parole Commission had rejected his application 
for parole, he used the motion for an improper purpose, i.e., as 
a substitute for the decision of the Parole Commission.  SeeUnited States 
v. Idone, 38 F.3d 693, 696-97 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
 
2. New Rule 35(b) and 28 U.S.C.  2255 
 
         Friedland asserts that he reached an agreement with 
Longarzo in the summer of 1990 that, in return for information, 
Longarzo would help him obtain a shortening of his sentence and 
would assist him before the Parole Commission.  Gov. app. 4.  
Friedland claims that the offices of the United States Attorneys 
for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York ratified this 
understanding.  Brief at 9.  He asserts that he has a right 
predicated on contractual principles and due process of law to 
have these promises enforced.  In his brief, he does not 
delineate clearly whether he is entitled to this relief directly 
under Rule 35(b) or under 28 U.S.C.  2255. 
         Friedland's contentions in this respect are bizarre.  
When new Rule 35(b) was adopted effective November 1, 1987, it 
provided that the court, "on motion of the Government, may within 
one year after the imposition of a sentence, lower a sentence to 
reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed 
an offense, in accordance with the guidelines and policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
section 994 of title 28, United States Code."  Pub. L. No. 98- 
473,  215, 98 Stat. 1837, 2016 (1984); Pub. L. No. 99-570,  
1009, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-8 (1986).  New Rule 35(b) was amended 
on April 30, 1991, with an effective date of December 1, 1991, to 
permit the court to "consider a government motion to reduce a 
sentence made one year or more after imposition of the sentence 
where the defendant's substantial assistance involves information 
or evidence not known by the defendant until one year or more 
after imposition of sentence." 
         As we have noted, the court sentenced Friedland on 
December 2, 1988.  Thus, in the summer of 1990, when Friedland 
claims to have made his agreement with Longarzo, the government 
could not file a motion on his behalf under the original and then 
applicable version of new Rule 35(b) because the time for such a 
motion had expired.  Nor could it file a motion on his behalf 
under the amended new Rule 35(b) as that amendment had not yet 
been adopted.  Consequently, Friedland claims to have been 
negotiating for assistance which as a matter of law could not 
have been given with respect to his sentence. 
         Notwithstanding this legal flaw in Friedland's 
argument, we have examined the voluminous documentation in the 
record and find nothing to support Friedland's contention that 
the government agreed to make a motion to reduce his sentence.  
But his assertion, which the government vigorously denies, even 
if true, gets him nowhere because it is perfectly clear that 
Friedland's dealings with assistant United States attorneys in 
the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York could not have 
included any such enforceable promise.   
         The office of the United States Attorney in New Jersey 
has taken the position without equivocation from the time of 
Alito's letter of April 3, 1989, that it would not negotiate with 
Friedland.  It maintains that position to this day.  Under 28 
U.S.C.  541 and 547 the United States Attorney is responsible 
for the prosecution of all criminal cases within his or her 
district.  The United States Attorney for the District of New 
Jersey never was removed from or superseded in the Friedland 
prosecution.  Consequently, only the United States Attorney for 
the District of New Jersey could file a motion for reduction of 
sentence in Friedland's case under new Rule 35(b).  Thus, as a 
matter of law, Friedland could not have negotiated an agreement 
for the government to move to reduce his sentence. 
         Of course, Friedland knew that the United States 
Attorney for the District of New Jersey would not file such a 
motion.  Indeed, that knowledge led him to deal with Longarzo and 
the New York assistant United States attorneys.   
         It is significant that Friedland, though disbarred, had 
been an attorney admitted to practice in the state and federal 
courts in New Jersey.  Thus, he should have recognized that at a 
minimum there was a serious legal question as to whether the 
district court could reduce his sentence without a motion from 
the United States Attorney in New Jersey requesting it to do so.  
It is also significant that the record makes it clear that 
Friedland has been involved personally in the legal aspects of 
his case.  Indeed, when we pointed out to Friedland's attorney at 
oral argument that Friedland's brief twice referred to Friedland 
as "me," suggesting that Friedland had written the brief, the 
attorney acknowledged that Friedland had participated in the 
writing of the brief.  Thus, this case does not involve any 
government overreaching by taking advantage of an unsophisticated 
defendant.   
         We recognize that, in some situations, a United States 
Attorney can form agreements that are effective outside of his or 
her district.  United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933, 94 S.Ct. 2646 (1974), on which 
Friedland relies, demonstrates this principle.  In Carter, on 
appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment, 
the court held that an alleged promise made by the United States 
Attorney for the District of Columbia to a cooperating defendant 
who helped in the apprehension and conviction of other 
defendants, if made, would be binding on the United States 
Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia.  But in Carter the 
alleged promise was that the District of Columbia prosecution 
would be "the sole prosecution against defendant."  Id. at 428.  
The agreement, if made, would have been binding with respect to a 
future prosecution in another district.  Thus, the Carter court 
remanded the matter to the district court for an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the government made the promise and, if 
so, whether the defendant relied on it.   
         Here the situation is different.  The prosecution in 
New Jersey had been completed long before Friedland opened his 
negotiations with Longarzo and with the assistant United States 
attorneys in New York.  We need not and will not determine how 
far a United States Attorney in one district may go in making 
agreements binding on other districts.  Rather, we hold only that 
the United States Attorney in New Jersey had exercised such a 
degree of control over the Friedland prosecution and the 
prosecution had progressed so far that, without his or her 
consent, as a matter of law the United States Attorneys in the 
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York could not bind the 
government to make a motion to reduce Friedland's District of New 
Jersey sentence.  Thus, notwithstanding Friedland's assertion 
that he had an agreement that the government would move to reduce 
his sentence, on the basis of the undisputed facts that the 
United States Attorney in New Jersey neither made nor consented 
to any such agreement, and from shortly after Friedland's 
sentencing told him it would make no promises to him and has 
adhered consistently with that position, the district court 
properly denied Friedland relief under new Rule 35(b) and under 
28 U.S.C.  2255. 
 
3. Parole and section 2241 
         a. Addonizio and Salerno 
         Friedland does make an interesting technical argument 
involving the interplay between United States v. Salerno, 538 
F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1976), and United States v. Addonizio, 442 
U.S. 178, 99 S.Ct. 2235. (1979)  In Salerno, we ordered a 
resentencing in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C.  
2255 when the defendant was not paroled within the period 
contemplated by the sentencing judge.  In Addonizio, however, the 
Supreme Court held that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction under section 2255 to reduce a sentence merely 
because the Parole Commission prolonged the defendant's period of 
incarceration beyond the time contemplated by the district court.  
The Court emphasized that, in general, Congress provided that the 
Parole Commission, and not the sentencing court, would determine 
when a lawfully sentenced defendant would be released.  Id. at 
188-89, 99 S.Ct. at 2242.  In this case, the district court 
thought that Friedland would be paroled between 40 and 52 months 
after his incarceration. 
         Friedland seeks to have Salerno applied here based on 
the following reasoning.  The court sentenced Friedland on 
December 2, 1988.  At that time, the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,  235(a)(1) and (b)(1), 98 Stat. 
1837, 2031-33 (1984), provided for abolition of the Parole 
Commission on November 1, 1992.  Thus, Friedland argues that 
after November 1, 1992,          
 
         the Court, not the Parole Commission, would 
         exercise parole supervision jurisdiction.  
         Thus, Judge Gerry [the sentencing judge who 
         has since died] had enforceable parole 
         expectations because after November 1, 1992, 
         according to the law in existence when he 
         sentenced Friedland, the Court and not the 
         Parole Commission would supervise Friedland's 
         parole.  Since Judge Gerry recommended on 
         Form A0235 that Friedland be paroled within 
         his Guideline range of 40-52 months, it is 
         reasonable to assume that he would follow his 
         own recommendation. 
 
Brief at 38-39. 
         Friedland acknowledges that section 235(b)(3) of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 obliged the Parole 
Commission to set a release date for an individual who would be 
in its jurisdiction the day before its scheduled abolition.  He 
further recognizes that the Parole Commission may depart from the 
parole guidelines.  But he reasons that under section 235(b)(4) 
"responsibility for parole supervision and revocation [is 
transferred] to U.S. District Judges."  Brief at 39.  Thus, in 
Friedland's view, when Judge Gerry sentenced him, the judge must 
have contemplated that if the Parole Commission rejected his 
parole application, a district judge could review his case 24 
months later.  18 U.S.C.  4208(h)(2).  While Friedland realizes 
that Congress has extended the Parole Commission's life by five 
years to 1997, see Pub. L. No. 101-650,  316, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5115 (1990), he believes that his hypothetical reconstruction of 
what would have happened if the Commission's life had not been 
extended should lead to his release because the two-year review 
period would have expired no later than two years after the 
original date for the abolition of the Commission in 1992. 
         We reject Friedland's argument for several reasons.  
First, the Parole Commission has not been abolished.  Second, it 
is by no means clear that Congress ever intended to authorize a 
district court to grant parole.  Section 235(b)(4) of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 provides "that the 
district court shall determine, in accord with the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, whether release should be revoked or the 
conditions of release amended for violation of a condition of 
release."  This provision says nothing about granting parole.  
Third, it is speculative to attempt to ascertain what a district 
court would have done with respect to parole, assuming that it 
had the power to grant parole, if Congress had not extended the 
life of the Parole Commission.  Perhaps the same arguments that 
convinced the Parole Commission to deny parole would have 
convinced a district judge to reach the same conclusion.  In this 
regard we observe that we see no reason why a judge passing on a 
parole application would be any more bound by a sentencing 
judge's expectation of when the defendant would be paroled than 
the Parole Commission itself after Addonizio. 
 
 
         b. Abuse of discretion 
 
         Friedland next contends that: (1) the Parole 
Commission's decision denying him parole was arbitrary; (2) the 
Commission did not consider the factors it should have taken into 
account in making its decision; (3) the record does not support a 
conclusion that he was a poor parole risk, and (4) the Commission 
relied on a false assessment of his crimes in reaching its 
conclusion.  He points out that he had excellent work reports, 
no incident reports, received bonuses for job performance, 
volunteered for service on the suicide watch, had an excellent 
institutional adjustment and received positive evaluations while 
incarcerated.  He also notes that Judge Gerry recommended that he 
be paroled after service of the parole guideline range of 40 to 
52 months and that his co-defendants were paroled after two years 
of imprisonment. 
         Our review of the district court's order denying 
Friedland relief under 28 U.S.C.  2241 is plenary.  United 
States ex rel. Schiano v. Luther, 954 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 
1992).  In contrast, we cannot disturb the Parole Commission's 
ruling unless it acted arbitrarily or capriciously or abused its 
discretion in reaching its result.  Bridge v. United States 
Parole Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97, 105 (3d Cir. 1992).  In exercising a 
deferential standard of review we recognize that although 
Friedland's parole guideline range was 40 to 52 months, the 
parole guidelines do not have the conclusive force of the 
sentencing guidelines.  Thus, 18 U.S.C.  4206(c) provides that 
the Commission may "deny release on parole notwithstanding the 
guidelines . . . if it determines there is good cause for so 
doing."  See Campbell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 704 F.2d 
106, 111 (3d Cir. 1983).  This rather nonspecific standard 
differs materially from the more exacting criteria for departure 
from the sentencing ranges established under the sentencing 
guidelines. 
         Our task, then, is to determine whether we can say that 
the Parole Commission abused its discretion in determining that 
there was good cause for denying Friedland parole.  In this 
regard, we note that release may be denied if it would 
"depreciate the seriousness of [the] offense or promote 
disrespect for the law."  18 U.S.C.  4206(a)(1).  The facts show 
that Friedland engaged in his second crime activity while he was 
on bond after his original convictions; this second crime took 
place over an extended time period while Friedland pretended to 
cooperate with the government; Friedland evaded income taxes; and 
his crime caused a multi-million dollar loss.  Friedland also 
mocked the criminal justice system by faking his own death and 
remaining a globe-trotting fugitive.  In the circumstances, his 
release would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. 
         We recognize that Friedland's institutional conduct 
superficially supports his application for parole.  Yet in some 
respects that very conduct is disturbing.  After his initial 
convictions he manipulated the government so that he could stay 
out of prison and commit a further crime.  He then faked his own 
death in an attempt to avoid apprehension.  Friedland's conduct 
in prison, the procuring of information from other inmates for 
his own benefit, is consistent with his prior manipulative 
conduct.  Furthermore, his efforts to circumvent the authority of 
the United States Attorney in New Jersey demonstrate that his 
manipulative character has not changed.  By any standard 
Friedland, though undoubtedly highly intelligent, is a cunning, 
manipulative individual, scornful of society's constraints. 
         Furthermore, while it is true that in a conventional 
sense, i.e., the causing vel non of management problems in 
prison, Friedland is not a problem prisoner, it hardly would be 
expected that a person with his background would present a 
discipline problem.  Overall, we think that the Commission was 
justified in concluding that Friedland was "a poorer risk than 
indicated by [his] salient factor score."   
         Friedland also attacks the predictive abilities of the 
Parole Commission, pointing out that "statistics on parole 
violators show how often the parole commission's decisions are 
wrong."  Brief at 31.  No doubt this statement is correct because 
paroled convicts do commit further crimes.  Yet this unfortunate 
fact is hardly a reason to upset a Parole Commission 
determination that a person should not be paroled in part because 
he is a poor risk.  If Friedland's history teaches us anything, 
it is that when not in custody he is dangerous.  After all, when 
he remained at liberty after his first convictions he was in a 
position analogous to that of a convict on parole.  Like a 
convict on parole, he was subject to some control under the 
criminal justice system but yet was not in physical custody.  We 
know what he did then, and we cannot fault the Parole Commission 
for wanting to avoid repetition of that conduct.  Friedland's 
institutional record in no way detracts from the Commission's 
conclusions.   
 
4. The request for an evidentiary hearing 
 
         Friedland finally argues that the court erred in 
denying him an evidentiary hearing.  We see no basis for this 
argument, as the undisputed facts show that he was not entitled 
to relief.  Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 
62 (3d Cir. 1989).  As we have explained, it is beyond dispute 
that his motion for reduction of sentence under old Rule 35(b) 
was not timely.  As a matter of law, he also was not entitled to 
relief under new Rule 35(b) or 28 U.S.C.  2255.  Finally, the 
fact that Friedland engaged in additional serious criminal 
conduct after his first convictions, and then faked his death and 
fled to avoid apprehension cannot be disputed, so it is clear 
that the Parole Commission did not abuse its discretion in 
denying him parole.  In the circumstances, there was no reason 
for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
 
                         III. CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the district 
court's orders of March 2, 1995, and August 3, 1995. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
         I concur in the majority's holding that the district 
court properly denied Friedland relief under his motions pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  2255 and both versions of Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 35.  
I believe, however, that the Parole Commission did not fully 
consider Friedland's case for parole, gave no valid reasons for 
an upward departure from its guidelines, and, thus, abused its 
discretion.  I therefore must respectfully dissent from that 
portion of the majority's opinion dealing with that issue, 
particularly Part II (3). 
         Then-Chief Judge John Gerry, an able and experienced 
trial judge of the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, sentenced Friedland.  Judge Gerry imposed a 
sentence which he believed would adequately reflect the 
seriousness of Friedland's offenses, punish Friedland, and permit 
his rehabilitation.  With the facts before him of all of 
Friedland's offenses, including his conduct in leading the United 
States Attorney's office for the District of New Jersey to 
believe that he would cooperate and instead committing another 
offense, and his flight while on bail, Judge Gerry imposed a 
sentence which would allow for parole eligibility after a period 
of 40 to 52 months of incarceration.  Friedland has, as of March 
25, 1996, served 100 months. 
         I recognize, as the majority notes, that the 
presumptive parole date set by Judge Gerry does not have the 
force of law.  Nor do I see merit in Friedland's procedural 
argument that the imminent dismantlement of the Parole Commission 
requires a return to this court's rule in United States v. 
Salerno, 538 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1976).  Because the Parole 
Commission is still in existence, the Supreme Court's rule set in 
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) still applies.  
Thus, I agree that the Parole Commission's departure from the 
parole date target set by Judge Gerry does not give the courts 
authority to reduce his sentence.  The Commission may disregard 
the guidelines if there is good cause for so doing. See, 18 
U.S.C.  4206(c). 
         Nonetheless, if the Parole Commission wishes to 
exercise its power to, in effect, overrule Judge Gerry's and the 
defendant's parole expectations, and disregard the recommendation 
of the Commission's interviewing panel in this case, it cannot do 
so arbitrarily and capriciously.   
         The reasons cited by the Commission lack substance.  
They rely solely on facts considered by the sentencing judge when 
he fixed the sentence;  the extended period of the fraud, the 
aborted cooperation, the flight, and the misconceived amount of 
loss.   The Commission cited no factors that the trial judge 
had not properly taken into account in setting the sentence.  His 
initial sentence was 7 years; his final sentence, in light of the 
second fraudulent offense and the factors now assigned by the 
Commission, was 15 years, 11 months, and 6 days.  Reiteration of 
these reasons, therefore, cannot constitute "good cause" for 
denying Friedland any parole at all. 
         The majority points out that 18 U.S.C.  4206(a)(1) 
authorizes a denial of parole if it may "depreciate the 
seriousness of offense or promote disrespect for the law."  It is 
this statute which the United States Attorney relied upon in 
urging the Commissioners to deny Friedland parole.  Friedland's 
offenses were serious, but he has served more than twice the 
sentencing judge's expectation in punishment for offenses that 
involved no violence, no assault upon any person, no drugs, no 
organized crime.  Instead of pointing to material factors that 
the sentencing judge may have disregarded or ignored, the 
Commission trumps the sentence of the judge by its own views of 
what the sentence should have been.  And it does so in total 
disregard of the appellant's exemplary prison record and of its 
own panel's recommendation that the prisoner be granted "a 
presumptive parole after service of 84 months provided the 
committed fine is paid or otherwise deposed of according to law."  
This suggested presumptive parole date even includes an extra 20 
months of confinement above the guidelines because of the 
Commission of the second offense "while subject was on bond on 
the first."  
         The Commission's speculation that parole would 
depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect 
for the law is a conclusory statement.  It has no facts to 
support it and relies on similar conclusory statements of the 
prosecuting attorney and the Department of Labor Special Agent.  
No personal victim opposes the parole; the appellant has done 
nothing since his incarceration that remotely suggests any 
misconduct or further disregard for the law on his part.  On the 
contrary, to the extent permitted, he has attempted to assist the 
Government in enforcing the law against those engaged in crime.  
From time to time, he has been helpful.  In the meantime, 
numerous white-collar criminals, some with offenses much more 
far-reaching and with offenses on a greater scale than this 
applicant, have been paroled after serving two to five years of 
their sentences.  This includes Friedland's own co-defendants, 
who, as fiduciaries of the Teamster's pension fund, were in as 
great or a greater position of trust than Friedland when they 
participated in the fraud.   
         In considering the prisoner's application for parole, 
it seems to me that sound reasons, as well as the Commission 
regulations, suggest that the Commission focus on the applicant's 
conduct since he began the service of his sentence, not his 
behavior that brought him into conflict with the law.  The 
purpose of penal punishment is not only to deter crimes but also 
rehabilitate.  Regulations of the Parole Commission require it 
to consider any reasonable information concerning the prisoner.  
29 C.F.R. 2.19-04(a).  The Commission may even consider an 
advancement of the presumptive release date for (1) superior 
program achievement over a period of 9 months in custody, 
pursuant to the provisions of 28 C.F.R. 2.60 and/or assistance in 
the prosecution of other offenders pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 2.63.  
Friedland has provided both. 
         Friedland's institutional record demonstrates an 
excellent adjustment, a sincere respect for law and order.  In 
addition to the positive reports and volunteer activities noted 
by the majority, Friedland also participated in the financial 
responsibility program to make restitution.  He wrote a letter to 
the Parole Commission that shows his remorse and understanding of 
the seriousness of his crime.  Every person who had personal 
contact with Friedland, from psychologists to the original panel 
of parole examiners, found him to be a candidate for parole. The 
Commission, however, has ignored completely any factor favorable 
in Friedland's behavior since his incarceration.  
         I also note in passing the extreme unlikeliness of 
recidivism in this case.  Friedland's crime was not one of 
violence, nor does he have a violent character.  Rather, he 
perpetrated a fraud made possible by a conflation of 
circumstances that are unlikely ever to happen again.  He is now 
sixty years of age.  He has been dismissed as counsel for 
Teamster Local No.701, the victim of the fraud.  He has been 
publicly humiliated and imprisoned.  It is highly unlikely that 
he will hold a position of trust again.  Besides, if paroled, he 
would be on probation and strict supervision.  This is obviously 
a time for healing, not vindictiveness on the part of the 
prosecution.  Besides, parole is only a conditional release, it 
is a modified continuation of punishment, and the parolee is 
under supervision and subject to return to prison for any 
infraction. 
         Moreover, the procedure used by the Commission in 
deciding this case is questionable.  A two-person panel of parole 
examiners originally conducted a hearing in this case at which 
Friedland appeared arguing for parole and two representatives of 
the United States Attorney's office in New Jersey and the United  
States Department of Labor appeared in opposition of parole.  The 
panel had an opportunity not only to study the record, the 
offenses and sentencing, but also to weigh the positions of the 
subject and the Government.  The two members of the panel were 
the only persons in the Commission to meet personally with both 
Friedland and the Government representatives opposing his parole.  
Paul C. Kurtz of the National Correctional Counseling Center in 
Washington, D.C., speaking in behalf of Friedland, urged parole 
at the time in accordance with the parole guidelines.  Kurtz did 
not believe it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense if 
the subject were paroled because this case did not differ from 
any other high profile fraud case, including Ivan Boesky, Jim 
Bakker or Michael Milliken.  Counsel for Friedland observed at 
the hearing that there was no publicity in the case but only 
manifestations of political rancor from the Office of the United 
States Attorney for the District of New Jersey.  The panel noted:  
"This was evident because subject has attempted to cooperate on 
numerous occasions but this had not been encouraged by that 
office."  
         Under Parole Commission procedures, it is usual for the 
panel's decision to be reviewed by the Regional Commissioner.  In 
this case, Friedland's application was appropriately designated 
as one for original jurisdiction.  This means that the Regional 
Commissioner, after reviewing the decision of the panel and 
making his own recommendation, sends the case to the National 
Parole Commission for final review.  Its decision is the final 
one.  Friedland did not have the opportunity to appear before 
either the Regional Commissioner or the National Commissioners.   
         Applicants for parole do not have a right to personal 
appearances before review boards.  See, e.g., Billiteri v. Board 
of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976).  Therefore, review boards 
should be particularly deferential to the findings and 
recommendations of the interviewing panel, presumably 
professionals, who weighed the merits of the presentations made 
in behalf of and in opposition to parole at that time.  The panel 
found: 
                    "It is the panel's finding's that subject 
                    should be paroled because the sentencing 
                    judge has no objection, but on the contrary, 
                    recommends parole in accordance with the 
                    parole guidelines.  In making its 
                    determination as to when subject should be 
                    paroled, the panel believes that the negative 
                    information provided by the representatives 
                    of the government is off-set by the favorable 
                    factors regarding subject which includes his 
                    cooperation and his institutional 
                    adjustment." 
           
         As an appellate court, we have many times recognized 
that the district courts which we review are in much better 
positions to judge such matters as the credibility, demeanor of 
witnesses, the harm of an evidentiary error, and the weight of 
the evidence.  We recognize that our review of a dry record, of 
necessity, cannot be as comprehensive as the review of the judge 
who watched and heard the issues being played out.  The Regional 
Commissioner and the National Commissioners here should exercise 
the same appellate restraint.  They are not in a position to make 
credibility judgments, but rather should defer to those of the 
panel.  Their review should by no means be a rubber-stamp of the 
panel decision, any more than appellate review rubber-stamps 
district court decisions.  Nonetheless, like appellate courts, 
the Commissioners should specifically note where the panel 
committed error if they wish to overrule its recommendation. 
         The Commissioners, all political appointees, did not do 
this in Friedland's application.  The Regional Commissioner, in 
his memorandum, merely details the facts of Friedland's pre- 
incarceration offenses, and concludes: "The aggravating factors 
of subject's [pre-sentence] behavior outweighs his cooperation 
and institutional adjustment significantly."  This conclusory 
statement does not explain why the same aspects of Friedland's 
behavior, which were taken into account by both Judge Gerry and 
by the panel examiners, merited more confinement than any of them 
had found appropriate.  The National Commissioners adopted the 
Regional Commissioner's recommendation.  Neither review board 
disputed, or even mentioned, the carefully weighed factual 
findings and the conclusions made by the panel at its hearing of 
Friedland on March 10, 1993, regarding his institutional 
adjustment, his remorse, or his ability to function in society.  
Just as appellate courts cannot reject out-of-hand the factual 
findings of trial courts, the Commissioners should not be able 
blithely to ignore those of the panel examiners who actually 
conducted a hearing on Friedland's application for parole. 
         These procedures do not show proper deference to the 
panel finders of fact.  Also, the Parole Commission usurped 
judicial power by departing from the parole guidelines solely for 
reasons already considered by Judge Gerry.  Moreover, the 
Commission does not point to any fact that justifies the outright 
denial of any parole.  
         I therefore believe that the Parole Commission abused 
its discretion in rejecting Friedland's application.  In turn, 
the district court perpetuated the conclusory action of the 
National Commission.  Hence, I respectfully dissent.  
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the district court 
with directions to remand the case to the Parole Commission with 
instructions to consider with proper deference the findings of 
the hearing panel  and for such further proceedings as are 
consistent with this opinion.   
